I. Introduction
The evolution of Austrian exchange rate and monetary policy illustrates the benefits of policy coordination and credibility 1 ).
The emergence of Austria's hard currency policy followed from policymakers' recognition of the benefits from coordination of economic policy with other countries, especially with Germany. The importance of making credible both the feasibility of this policy and Austria's commitment to it emerged very soon.
Austria is a small open economy with high capital mobility; its exchange rate policy currently pegs its currency to that of a lowinflation anchor currency, i.e. the Deutsche mark. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement, twenty years ago, however, there have been two distinct periods or regimes for Austrian monetary and exchange rate policies: i) In the l970s, exchange rate policy was discussed in terms of price stabilization, the ability to import stability, and the role of the real appreciation of the schilling in this process. A limited float against each currency aimed at pursuing the domestic inflation goal. Monetary measures were more discretionary during this period.
ii) At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s; the necessary harmonization of fundamentals between the anchor country and Austria was emphasized; the idea of stabilizing expectations 1) Kahn (1987) provides a useful description of the benefits and 9-hc~~i-~nf nclfcv coordination. Policy developments in the recent period can be viewed as attempts to achieve policy coordination and to foster the credibility and reputation of the monetary authorities. A growing literature points to the significant role of credibility and reputation in economic policy in individual countries, and these issues also bear great importance in the context of the European Monetary System and the European Monetary Union. Thus, the focus of discussion in Austria has also shifted to these issues. The credibility of Austria's exchange rate policy was widely achieved at the beginning of the 1980s, but challenges to this credibility, or to Austria's commitment to its policy, have occurred subsequently and are inevitable in the future. Such challenges have clarified the real economic significance of credibility and reputation and strenghtened the understanding of their role in the successful implementation of the hard currency policy.
The evolution of the Austrian exchange rate policy has been presented elsewhere (Handler 1989, Hochreiter and Knöbl 1991, and  others), so only a short historical outline is presented-in the next section. Then we examine some evidence on the effects of changes in Austrian policy coordination.
II. The Evolution of the Hard Currency Policy
When the Bretton Woods System came to an end and the United States closed the gold window in August 1971, Austria had to reconsider the anchor for its exchange rate and monetary policy. A free float was not seriously considered because of the supposed uncertainties connected with it, and especially the impact of these
•uncertainties on contracts. It was widely believed that these uncertainties would permanently lower economic activity and make it more volatile. As a result, Austria was one of the first 3 countries to monitor an effective exchange rate and to use it as an 'indicator' for policy.
The indicator comprised the currencies of nine important trading partners (German mark, Swiss franc, Dutch guilder, Belgian franc, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish krona, Lira and Pound Sterling). These were not exactly the most important trading partners. The
French franc, for instance, was not included, nor was the dollar.
The nine cu~encies were weighted into a basket according to their trade weights (only trade in goods was taken into account, not trade in services or capital transactions).
The adoption of such a basket as an indicator for policy was based on Austria's National Bank Act which defines price stability as the primary task and responsibility of the Austrian National Bank.
Article 3 of paragraph 2 explicitly says that the Bank "...has to ensure with all the means at its disposal that the value of the Austrian currency is maintained with regard both to its domestic purchasing power and to its relationship with stable foreign currencies. "2)
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement this task was interpreted as requiring that the value of the schilling be stabilized relative to currencies with relatively stable domestic prices, that is, currencies whose external value had been rising relative to other countries with higher inflation rates. This was expected to keep the rise of Austrian import prices relatively low.
In a small open economy with a high import content in production and consumption, with a fast pass-through of world market prices to domestic prices, which, in turn, are passed through to wages and costs, such a policy is expected to restrain the domestic price level to a correspondingly high extent. Thus, the currencies of those countries that, under floating, had inflated their economies (i.e., the Pound Sterling and the Lira) or that were devalued for reasons of competitiveness (Swedish 2) This dual stability objective is only consistent if the value of the schilling is pegged to currencies which enjoy a stable purchasing power. The subsequent evolution of exchange rate policy can perhaps best be understoo~in terms of these twin 4 Krona) were eliminated from the basket in the course of the following years.
In 1973, Austria unilaterally declared its adherence to the European snake, though not becoming an official member of this arrangement. Thus, between this time and 1976 there were two parallel guidelines, the snake and the indicator, but they never seriously conflicted. However, the observed depreciation of other snake currencies against the German mark implied, given attempts to stabilize the indicator, a concomitant weakening of the schilling against the Deutsche mark, as long as the snake's fluctuation limits (+1-2 1/4 %) were adhered to. This problem was resolved first by doubling the band acceptable to Austria and then by dropping the snake orientation altogether and pegging the schilling exclusively to the German mark.
This change in the orientation of the exchange rate regime was also a consequence of another related Austrian innovation, the role of real appreciations in the 'hard currency policy'. In 1974, inflation had surged world-wide in the wake of the first oil price shock. In Austria the rate of inflation approached 10 percent.
Because of the pass-through effects that were inherent in the Austrian system of social partnership, the schilling was revalued by 4 1/2 percent to bring inflation down.
It was clear that this hard currency policy would result in a real appreciation and in a worsening of the current account. Both effects, however, were accepted by the policymakers as they were confident that the domestic economy would adjust to the new exchange rate level in due course. There was also the conviction that an alternative exchange rate policy that focused on competitiveness or employment would not succeed because wage earners would react to devaluation-induced price increases and a 'vicious circle' would result. Experience in 'soft currency' countries had made this very clear (Hochreiter -Knäbl 1991).
Thus, three considerations were decisive for the development of the hard currency policy. First, price stability can be imported via the pass-through from the prices of imported goods to consumer 5 prices or to the prices of production inputs. In some periods even real appreciations were accepted despite adverse effects on the current account. Second, appreciations cause a profit squeeze in the exposed-sector that leads to rationalization, innovation, rising productivity, and improved structure. It also prevents excessive wage increases. Third, by these mechanisms -a lower inflation rate as a precondition for the incomes policy and a profit squeeze in the exposed sector limiting the possibilities for wage increases -some 'virtuous circle' effects are brought into play, validating the appreciated exchange rate in the longer run.
Stabilizing Expectations
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Austrian economy faced a series of national and international problems which had effects similar to those of a negative supply shock. Again, the option of devaluation was not chosen -on the one hand because of the long held conviction that this would not produce lasting positive effects, but also because the credibility of the hard currency policy already had to be defended.
The authorities also recognized that in a world of high and rising capital mobility a devaluation would raise the variability ofexchange rates and that this effect would alter the public's expectations about future exchange rates. Once a devaluation was effected -and reputation lost -these expectations would change.
More volatile capital flows and movements in the interest rate differential could result. Policymakers believed that an important role of the central bank was to stabilize the market participants'.
expectations by reducing, as much as possible, the uncertainties about the future exchange rate.
In the short term, this is done by limiting exchange rate fluctuations to an absolute minimum through the permanent presence of the Bank in the foreign exchange market and by the adjustment of interest rates. Austrian exchange market intervention goes -6 beyond the scope of conventional intervention. For example, it encompasses measures to coordinate the timing of the federal government's capital imports with intervention policy (see, for instance, Tichy 1986).
In the long run, however, stabilization of exchange rate expectations can only be achieved if underlying macroeconomic aggregates, or economic fundamentals, are also stabilized. Thus, economic policy had to be coordinated with Germany if the feasibility of the hard currency option was to become and remain credible. In this respect, successful economic policy coordination was a precondition for credibility.
'Monopolistic Coordinal~ion'
The modern focus on international policy coordination was initiated by Hamada (1976) Under the assumption of purchasing power parity, equations (1) and (2) can be combined to an equation for the exchange rate of these two countries:
The model establishes that relative changes in money supply, interest rate and real income affect the exchange rate. An increase in the money supply at home leads to an equiproportionate depreciation. Because an increase in domestic real income raises the demand for real balances and thus leads to a fall in domestic prices it induces an offsetting exchange rate appreciation.
Relatively higher domestic interest rates, by contrast, reduce the demand for real balances, raise prices, and therefore bring about an exchange depreciation.
With free capital movements, the domestic interest rate is tied to the center's by the financial market arbitrage condition
where~e' is the expected change of the exchange rate and rp is the risk premium.
With a nominal exchange rate peg and sufficient credibility of this policy,~e' would be zero.
Combining equations (4) and (5) and solving for m, the constraint on domestic monetary policy is:
With e fixed,~e' is zero; given that rp, which is minimized when e is fixed, as well as x and x~are constants, the following first-difference (A) relationship holds:
(7)~m = Am* + aj. (Ày -Ay*) Domestic nominal money growth is therefore determined by the anchor country's money supply growth and the real economic growth differential between these two countries. As a result, inflation rates and nominal interest rates are also closely tied together when e is fixed by the domestic monetary authority. In such an economy, the central bank is restricted to influence only the sources of money creation, i.e. domestic or foreign component, but not its magnitude.
Credibility and Reputation
Issues of credibility and reputation and their benefits have been central to the transformation of exchange rate and monetary policy in Austria over the past 20 years 4 ).
Credibility refers to the extent to which beliefs concerning a certain policy conform to official announcements about this policy. To achieve credibility, the authorities must precommit themselves to a particular policy rule. Credibility may thus also be viewed as a measure of the degree to which policymakers tie their hands on future policies to their public policy -announcements. Reputation, on the other hand, is the probability which the public assigns to the consistent pursuit of a certain policy. It is derived by learning over time from the actual behavior of the monetary authorities (Weber 1991).
4) The role of credibility and reputation was first modeled by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and further developed by Barro and -Gordon (1983) . The distinguishing feature of this work is that government is not exogenous in the analysis. Policy is made endogenous by specifying a government objective function and assuming that the government maximizes its objective under the constraints imposed by private equilibrium behavior (Persson In order to obtain credibility, two elements are needed: First, an economic program must be feasible, stand the test of professional scrutiny, and reflect the experience of, and lessons from, other episodes. Second, policy commitments must not be susceptible to the time inconsistency problem, providing incentives to change the policy direction in mid-course. Policymakers must demonstrate that they are willing to continue an announced policy. For example, the adoption of a rule-based policy framework can reduce discretion and the perception of arbitrariness and, thereby, strengthen confidence in the policy-making process (Calvo and Frenkel 1991) .
In the beginning, the hard currency policy was not widely perceived to be feasible (see Hochreiter and Winckler 1991 for more detail). The measures taken in 1974 were followed by a massive deterioration of the current account deficit which reached 4,4 % of GDP in 1977. The strategy became increasingly criticized and confidence that it could be maintained was low. Industry opposed this policy and favoured a real exchange rate rule instead of pegging to the German mark. There was also criticism in academic circles and international organisations.
In this period, however, the central bank did not leave any doubt that it would maintain its exchange rate objectives, and if necessary, intervene and adjust the interest rate differential to whatever level required. Key policymakers had come to the conclusion that it was the economy which had to adjust to the exchange rate and not the other way around. A deviation from the course would leave central bank, budget, and unions worse off.
Later, in October 1978, in order to placate critics of the policy a realignment in the snake was handled in such a way that the schilling lost about 1 % against the German mark.-Obviously, thi~-change was inconsistent, so that credibility and reputation wer damaged.
In 1979, however, when oil prices rose quickly in the wake of tL
Iranian revolution, the idea of appreciating the nominal exchanrate to keep inflationary pressures low was again brought into 13 discussion, and in September of that year the schilling was revalued against the German mark by 1 1/2 percent, followed by gradual appreciations until late 1981 amounting finally to 4 1/2 percent. Since then, the schilling/mark relation remained nearly constant.
Subsequently, credibility and also reputation were rebuilt.
Official and press statements increasingly supported the policy. Also industry finally dropped its opposition. Thus, the public attached increasingly high probability to the consistent pursuit of the announced policy. The argument which nowadays is often used in connection with the EMS, that by a policy of this kind a country is enabled to borrow anti-inflationary reputation from the Bundesbank by credibly fixing the exchange rate to the German mark, was first adopted, credibly maintained and validated in the Austrian case.
Me~suringCredibility
The credibility of a currency peg is often measured by the interest rate differential. A low interest rate is usually considered as the reward for a successful buildup of credibility.
If the pegging country achieves better fundamentals, interest rates can even be lower than in the anchor country. This will, however, be the exceptional case. Usually the country pegging to a stable anchor currency has a positive risk premium, or interest rates are in general a bit higher than those of the reference currency. In Austria the 'necessary' interest rate differential to
Germany was considered to be up to one percentage point in the early eighties, but has decreased in the wake of ever increasing capital mobility and rising credibility of Austrian exchange rate policy. of capital mobility, but rather the problems these countries have experienced in terms of the credibility of the official exchange rate policy ruleS).
In Austria, credibility of exchange rate policies might have suffered between 1984 and 1987 because of a surge in domestic inflation, a deterioration in the current account and a negative growth differential. Just as in the Dutch case the rise in the interest rate differential can be considered as an indicator of this credibility loss 6 ).
The inflation rate (as measured by the change in the consumer price index) surged in Austria in 1984 (chart 1) to a large part because of an increase in the value added tax (VAT) and a considerable rise in administered prices. In 1984, the 5,6 percent Austrian inflation rate was about 2 points higher than a year earlier and about 3 points higher than in Germany; Austrian 5) There may be imperfect substitutability of these assets due to tax treatment, tax or other sources of sovereign risk which mediate against this interpretation, however. Kool and Tatom (1988) provide evidence that short-term interest rates are not closely correlated across G-5 countries in the 1977-87 period. Nevertheless, long-term rates are significantly linked, so that, if real rates are arbitraged across countries, then long-run inflation rares are expected to be similar as well. 6) This view is not generally held in Austria but it makes sense 15 inflation (and interest rates) remained high relative to Germanũ ntil the second half of 19887). Episodes like this should reinforce or enhance credibility, although it is premature to assert that this really also occurred. Nevertheless, this example of a temporary widening in the interest rate spread suggests that it is a useful measure of credibility.
III. Empirical Evidence on Convergence and Coordination
The alterations in Austrian policy coordination since 1970 suggest that there should be evidence of convergence between Austrian and German economic developments, especially for nominal aggregates.
The outcome for growth of output, current account, fiscal deficits, and unemployment may not be so clear on a priori grounds. Some casual evidence of convergence can be obtained by examining the data in Table 1 . More direct evidence based on causality tests also is provided below.
Since the early l970s, Austria. succeeded in reducing its inflation rate by more than the reduction in Germany; generally, however, its inflation has been higher than in Germany. Chart 1 shows the rate of increase of consumer prices and the levels of nominal short and long-term interest rates. The chart also suggests that inflation and interest rates have exhibited some tendency to converge in the 1980s. Another nominal measure, unit labor costs in manufacturing, is a widely used measure for price performance and competitiveness because it largely excludes the sheltered sector. This measure also shows a tendency to converge (see table 1) because faster growth in Austrian productivity has offset faster wage growth in Austria.
According to table 1, there also has been some convergence in the growth rate of real GDP since the early l970s, although this has been associated with slower growth for Austria. Austria's external 7) A withholding tax on interest receipts was introduced at the same time and kept in force until mid-1986. But the tax, rate was too low (7 1/2 % in 1984 and 5 % thereafter) to fullyxniRin the rise in the interest differential. Germany. This relative success is typically attributed to Austria's specific policy mix, oácasionally referred to as "Austrokeynesianism".
Generally speaking, the convergence of economic fundamentals with those of the center country has been realised to a relatively high extent. In AuStria's case, the disciplinary effects of coordination to Germany were earned, but this fact did not entail tying every aspect of the real economy to the German one. The experience suggests that pegging the exchange rate does not necessarily imply that, for instance, the inflation-unemployment trade-off of the anchor country had to be fully accepted -at least not in -the longer run, when the structural characteristics -of the labor markets (comparatively high real wage flexibility in Austria) dominate (Hochreiter -Knöbl 1991). Also, a much less favourable current account balance was sustained in Austria ovei long period. the East German Mark as part of the unification process. As a result, there was a monetary shock to West Germany and countries pegging to the DM,as the adjustment to this transition progressed. While the results described here should not be altered by these developments in any qualitative way,. The Granger causality test was conducted for each variable in each period using the same procedure. First, the univariate time series process of the growth rate (first-difference ir~the logarithm) was determined for the Austrian and German measure, then up to eight quarterly lagged values of the counterpart variable for the other country were tested to determine if the past behavior of the measure in Germany (Austria) had statistically significant explanatory power for the same variable in Austria (Germany) 9 ). A five percent significance level is used as the test criterion. For interest rates, simple first-differences of the variables are enough so that this brief experience could bias the results. 9) The Q-statistics reported in tables 2 to 7 are Box-Pierce statistics to test for white-noise residuals with 12 lags. None of these statistics are statistically significant, indicating that the residuals for the test equations are white-noise.The test equations were also estimated using first-order moving average error processes. There is some evidence that MA1 error processes are significant for industrial production and German long-term interest rates when they substitute for autoregressive processes that are otherwise significant. Table 4 presents causality results for the consumer price index.
These results are somewhat more mixed than for the other variables. In particular, in the first period, when both country's inflation rates are expected to depend more on reserve currency growth outside the two countries, there is some evidence of causality from Austrian inflation to German inflation. This result is dubious, however, because it only arises with an unusually long pure time delay of 4 to 6 quarters. In the second period, there is causality from the German rate of price increase to that in Austria. In the coordination period, the results again show that German developments play a causal role in Austria, but Austrian nominal developments, like inflation, do not cause their German counterpart.
Industrial Production Table 5 shows the causality results for the growth rate of industrial production in each country. In all three periods the growth of German industrial production causes growth of industrial production in Austria. Only in the last period is there any evidence of causality from Austrian industrial production growth to German industrial production growth. This may not reflect any influence of the exchange rate regime, however, because the overall effect is zero (the sum of the lagged growth rates equals O.2750,t = 0.92). Nevertheless the evidence is consistent with a tightening in the relationship between the real sectors of the two economy.
noise, except for the German base in the coordination period, which is AR?. This absence of causality, given the results for Mi and M3, suggests that the existing measures of the base are inadequate for capturing monetary policy actions. For example, neither measure includes excess reserves. Also, unusual movements in the currency ratio affect the base associated with a given level of the money stock. For this reason, the targeting and measurement of the monetary base was abandoned
Long-term Interest Rates Table 6 shows the causality results for long-term interest rates.
Only 
Short-terms Interest Rates
The results for short-term rates in table 7 are more consistent with the hypotheses. The short-term rate in Austria and Germany are the quarterly averages of monthly interest rates on 3-month government securities. During the latest period, the hypothesis of unidirectional causality from Germany to Austria is not rejected.
During the limited-floating period, changes in short-term rates in each country are independent of changes in short-term rates in the other country. Finally, in the earliest period, there is unidirectional causality from Germany to Austria; this may reflect --ii) Note that the equation for the German long rate in the 1980s indicate a negative effect of Austrian rates on German rates. When the two past Austrian changes are constrained to have no total effect on the German rate, however, the constraintcannot be rejected (t = -1.09). The constrained effect is 
Cointegration of Short-term Interest Rates
The strong, close connection between German and Austrian shortterm interest rates since 1979 and its attribution to Austrian economic policy actions is supported by the causality results.
Stronger evidence of this relation is found in cointegration testsl 3 ). For the coordination period, the cointegration vector The residual, Rt, is stationary according to the Dickey-Fuller test recommended by Engle and Granger (1987) . In particular, (9) ARt = -0.5394 and no lags of the dependent varaible are significant. The tstatistic is much larger in absolute value than the critical value (5 percent) of 3.37 given in Engle and Granger, table 214).
Such a strong long-run relationship between these short rates does not hold in either of the earlier periods, even though the same 12) In the fixed rate period, only the fifth lag of the change in the German rate is statistically significant and only when it is included alone instead of along with the first four lags. When the causality test is conducted with no lagged dependent variables, Austrian rates still have no statistically significant effect on German rates. 13) If variables are cointegrated, then causality tests involving -their first-differences can be biased against rejecting the absence of 'causality by omitting a significant lagged residual from the cointegrating vector from the causality test equation. In both of the causality equations for Austrian short-rates and for Austrian inflation such a consideration has no effect on the reported causality test results. 14) The reverse cointegrating vector yields the same statisticallysignificant evidence of cointegration in the coordination period of the 1980s and not in the other two periods.
unidirectional causality from German to Austrian rates holds in the fixed rate period. In the floating rate period, ISG is not significant in the cointegrating vector (t = 1.88); moreover, the t-statistic on the lagged residual in testing its stationarity is only -2.79, which is small enough in absolute value to reject stationarity.
In the fixed rate period, the cointegrating vector is: In both cases stationarity of the residual, and hence cointegration, are rejected.
Since arbitrage should tie expected real rates of return across countries together, expected inflation should also be cointegrated when nominal rates are. A check of the time series properties of consumer prices in Austria and Germany over the three regime periods indicates that they are 1(2) in all three periods.
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